December 2025. Georgia Department of Corrections documented 71 drone incidents at state prisons—the highest monthly total on record.
Commissioner Tyrone Oliver's assessment: "We're under attack every single day when it comes to combating this issue. It's a threat from above."
This reflects operational reality. Georgia isn't unique—it's simply one of the states maintaining consistent records.
Understanding the Scale
Since 2022, Georgia has documented over 1,000 drone incidents at or near state prisons. This includes sightings, contraband deliveries, and related arrests.
In 2024 alone, the Georgia Department of Corrections recovered drugs, weapons including firearms and knives, and thousands of cellphones from drone-related incidents. These recoveries resulted in over 540 felony arrests.
The U.S. Bureau of Prisons reports a 70% increase in drone-related smuggling attempts during 2025 across federal facilities. State prison numbers—where tracking varies by jurisdiction—appear comparable or higher.
England and Wales recorded 1,712 drone incidents between April 2024 and March 2025, a 43% increase from the previous year. Reports indicate sophisticated platforms capable of carrying multiple payloads.
The pattern is consistent across jurisdictions. Current security frameworks struggle to address it.
Operation Skyhawk: A Case Study in Scale
March 2024. Georgia authorities announced the largest smuggling bust in state correctional history.
Operation Skyhawk dismantled a drone-based smuggling network operating across the prison system. The investigation yielded:
- 150+ arrests, including 8 corrections employees
- 87 drones seized
- 273 contraband cellphones recovered
- 22 weapons confiscated
- Large quantities of tobacco, marijuana, methamphetamine, ecstasy, and cocaine
- Estimated contraband value: $7 million
The investigation centered on a Gwinnett County drone repair shop called Thunder Drones. The owner and an employee were arrested. Searches of the business and residence yielded over 50 additional drones suspected of involvement.
This represented organized criminal infrastructure, not opportunistic individual activity.
The Economics and Operations
The financial incentives for drone smuggling are substantial.
A successful delivery can yield $10,000 to $50,000 depending on payload and destination. Equipment costs a few thousand dollars. Even with significant loss rates, the return on investment remains compelling.
Operational characteristics compound the financial calculus:
Distance operations. Unlike physical approaches to facility perimeters, drone operators can work from vehicles positioned miles away. No presence at the fence line. No direct observation by security.
Limited exposure. If a drone is detected or lost, the operator loses equipment value but faces minimal personal risk at the point of delivery.
Advancing capability. Early prison drones carried approximately 4 pounds at 45 mph. Current platforms transport 25-pound duffle bags at speeds exceeding 75 mph. Payload capacity and range continue improving.
Continuous availability. Drones operate at night when detection proves most difficult. Multiple platforms can be deployed sequentially.
Commissioner Oliver noted that Operation Skyhawk temporarily reduced activity—incidents dropped to 15 in December 2024. However, by November 2025, incidents reached 63. December established a new record.
The pattern suggests network resilience. Enforcement actions create temporary disruption; operations resume.
The Structural Challenge
The fundamental issue remains unaddressed at the policy level.
Correctional facilities have detection capabilities. They can identify approaching drones, track flight paths, and document incidents.
What they cannot legally do is intercept them.
Federal law restricts counter-UAS authority to four agencies: DOD, DOJ, DHS, and DOE. State prisons don't qualify. Neither do local jails or private correctional facilities.
Under FAA regulations, drones are registered aircraft. Interfering with them—jamming, disabling, capturing—constitutes a federal offense. A corrections officer who stops a drone delivering weapons to inmates could face prosecution.
Commissioner Oliver has informed state lawmakers that federal restrictions directly limit Georgia's response options. Current protocol doesn't include drone interdiction.
Detection without interdiction capability documents the problem without solving it.
Canadian Comparison
Canada implemented its first dedicated anti-drone smuggling operation targeting correctional facilities in early 2025.
After nine months of coordinated operations, the pilot project reduced drone deliveries by approximately 50% at Kingston's four federal prisons.
The difference: Canadian authorities implemented comprehensive counter-drone protocols including detection, tracking, and response capabilities that U.S. facilities currently lack legal authority to deploy.
In the United States, the FCC voted unanimously on September 30, 2025 to explore allowing state and local prisons to use cellphone jamming technology—addressing one aspect of the contraband problem.
However, jamming communications and interdicting drones are different capabilities. "Exploring" authority differs from granting it.
Georgia Attorney General Chris Carr has advocated for expanded jamming authority for years. Progress has been gradual.
Contraband Categories
The materials reaching facilities reveal the scope of the problem:
Drugs. Fentanyl, methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, synthetic cannabinoids. Substances that drive prison economies and violence.
Cellphones. Thousands recovered annually. Phones enable ongoing criminal enterprise—coordinating distribution networks, witness intimidation, fraud operations.
Weapons. Firearms and edged weapons that escalate the consequences of disputes.
Tobacco. Prohibited in most facilities but commanding extraordinary black market value. Individual packs can sell for $50-100 internally.
Each successful delivery affects institutional control. Each phone enables external communication for criminal purposes. Each weapon increases risk to staff and inmates.
The operators understand delivery success rates and have calculated risk-reward ratios accordingly.
Technology Asymmetry
Drone capability has advanced faster than correctional response infrastructure.
Platforms available in 2020 carried modest payloads at limited speeds. Current systems represent substantial improvement:
- Heavy-lift capacity exceeding 25 pounds
- Speeds above 75 mph
- Flight durations of 30-45 minutes
- Sophisticated GPS navigation
- Night-vision and low-observable operations
Smuggling operations access the same commercial technology available to any consumer. They have capital for capable platforms and operational experience from thousands of flights.
Corrections departments deploy detection systems—when budgets permit—designed for earlier-generation capabilities. Funding constraints limit technology updates. Training programs lag capability development.
The resource asymmetry favors the operators.
Legislative Development
The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act includes language addressing counter-drone authority for correctional facilities.
Implementation represents a separate challenge.
Even with expanded authority, facilities require:
- Detection systems capable of threat identification
- Mitigation technology effective in complex environments
- Staff training on equipment and protocols
- Law enforcement coordination for operator prosecution
- Budget allocation for acquisition and maintenance
Legislative authorization and operational capability follow different timelines. Drone operations continue regardless.
Broader Implications
Prison drone smuggling connects to wider security patterns.
The payload capacity delivering drugs can transport weapons. The operational methods enabling contraband drops can enable surveillance. The networks serving prison operations can target other facilities.
Cartel organizations along the southern border employ identical tactics—often with more sophisticated platforms—for cross-border smuggling. Techniques transfer across contexts. Operators learn from shared experience.
A correctional facility represents a test environment for drone delivery into secured perimeters. Each successful prison drop validates methods applicable to fences, walls, and detection systems generally.
What proves effective at a state prison may prove effective elsewhere.
Requirements for Progress
Authority expansion. Correctional facilities need legal authorization to address drone threats. Current timelines are inadequate.
Federal funding for capabilities. FEMA C-UAS grants announced in December 2025 include correctional facilities as eligible applicants. States should pursue these resources.
Coordinated enforcement. Arresting individual drone pilots doesn't address organized operations. Enforcement needs to target networks—the support infrastructure, financing, and coordination with inmates.
Technology investment. Effective counter-drone systems exist commercially. Correctional departments need budget authority for acquisition and deployment.
Standardized tracking. Incident documentation varies significantly by state. Without consistent data, problem scope remains unclear and resource allocation stays reactive.
Assessment
Georgia documented 71 drone incidents in one month. The commissioner describes daily threats. The largest smuggling investigation in state history resulted in 150 arrests and $7 million in seized contraband.
The pattern continues.
This illustrates what occurs when institutional security meets well-resourced opposition operating without the same legal constraints. Detection without interdiction. Documentation without effective response.
The federal policy debate has proceeded for years while organized criminal networks have refined delivery operations. The capability gap shows in the statistics.
Seventy-one incidents. One month. One state.
The airborne threat isn't theoretical. It's documented, increasing, and largely unaddressed.
Brian Rutherford covers security challenges where institutional response hasn't matched adversary capability evolution.
Sources
- Threat from Above: Prisons Face Escalating Threat from Drones — ABC News
- Prisons Face A Growing Threat From Smuggling Drones — DroneXL
- Operation Skyhawk: Drones Used in Georgia's Largest Prison Smuggling Case — DroneLIFE
- 150 Arrested in Georgia Prison Smuggling Ring Using Drones — ABC News
- Canada's First Anti-Drone Prison Task Force Cuts Contraband Drops 50% — DroneXL
- C-UAS for Correctional Facilities: Preventing Drone Smuggling — D-Fend Solutions
- Contraband Entering Georgia Prisons from Drones Again — DroneXL
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