Cartels Are Learning Drone Warfare in Ukraine

Last year I wrote about 60,000 cartel drone flights along the southern border. That piece focused on the threat as it existed in late 2024.

The situation has evolved.

What follows is an update based on developments over the past several weeks—military deployments, intelligence operations, and one particularly concerning report from Mexican and Ukrainian intelligence services.

The Ukraine Connection

Mexico's National Intelligence Center sent a warning to Ukraine's counterintelligence service. The subject: Spanish-speaking volunteers in Ukraine's International Legion who appeared more interested in FPV drone training than fighting Russians.

The concern, according to Intelligence Online reporting, is that cartel-linked operatives embedded within semi-clandestine units specifically to acquire first-person-view drone warfare skills.

This isn't speculation about future capability development. This is an active counterintelligence investigation into skills transfer from an active war zone to criminal organizations operating near American cities.

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel conducted what open-source analysts identified as Mexico's first confirmed one-way attack drone strike in April 2025. The timing aligns with when trained operatives would have returned from overseas.

From Surveillance to Strike

The original 60,000 flights were primarily surveillance operations. Tracking Border Patrol movements. Timing shift changes. Identifying gaps.

That phase appears to be ending.

Mexican military data shows the escalation: 5 drone attacks in 2020. 260 in 2023. By late 2025, attacks occurred almost daily in contested regions like Michoacán.

The Mexican Army has confirmed soldiers killed by these attacks.

The weapons have evolved with the tactics. Early cartel drones dropped grenades from hover positions—effective but imprecise. FPV drones carry explosives that detonate on contact. They can fly through windows. Into vehicles. The operator sees what the drone sees until impact.

A 2024 strike in southern Mexico killed six people and wounded thirteen. One drone. One operator. Casualties that would have previously required a ground assault team.

Cartels Now Field Counter-UAS

The technology transfer flows both directions.

The Mayito Flaco faction of the Sinaloa Cartel has been photographed with SkyFend counter-drone jammers—systems retailing for approximately $100,000. CJNG forces have acquired QR-07S3 Digital Eagle anti-drone guns at roughly $20,000 per unit.

These aren't improvised solutions. These are commercial-grade systems that defense contractors sell to military and law enforcement customers.

The implication: cartels can now protect high-value targets and operations from aerial surveillance while conducting their own drone campaigns. They've achieved a form of air superiority in their operating areas.

When your adversary has both offensive and defensive drone capability, the tactical equation changes fundamentally.

The American Response

The Pentagon has deployed. 10th Mountain Division personnel now operate AN/MPQ-64 radar systems in Arizona. Total military presence on the border exceeds 3,500 troops.

More significantly, Rear Admiral Paul Spedero confirmed that service members "have authority right now on the southwest border to engage UAS."

That's a change from the detection-only posture I described last year.

The CIA has been flying MQ-9 Reaper drones over Mexico since early 2025—unarmed surveillance missions that have contributed to at least two cartel leader arrests according to Mexico's top general.

DHS Secretary Kristi Noem told Congress in December that DHS has invested "upwards to $1.5 billion" in drone and counter-drone technology. The FY2026 NDAA includes major counter-UAS restructuring with a dedicated DOD task force.

The infrastructure for response is being built. The question is whether it's being built fast enough.

The Escalation Risk

RANE/Stratfor assesses that Trump is "more likely than not to launch some direct operations against Mexican cartels before he leaves office"—potentially ranging from drone strikes to ground operations.

The cartel terrorist designation in February 2025 provides legal framework for such action.

Consider the scenario: U.S. drone strikes begin targeting cartel infrastructure in Mexico. Cartels respond with FPV attacks against U.S. personnel at the border—personnel they've been surveilling for years and whose patterns they know intimately.

The Atlantic Council notes this explicitly: "Should US policy escalate to commonplace kinetic strikes against cartels, FPV drones could quickly be redirected toward US personnel and infrastructure."

Border patrol stations. Forward operating bases. The surveillance has already mapped these targets. The strike capability now exists to hit them.

What Changed

Last year, I wrote about an authorization that existed but hadn't been executed. Cartel leadership had approved explosive drone attacks against U.S. personnel. The capability existed. The calculus determining when to strike remained uncertain.

Several factors have shifted:

Capability has increased. FPV drones are more lethal than the surveillance platforms that flew those 60,000 missions. Operatives have potentially trained in actual combat conditions.

Counter-capability has emerged. Cartels can now defend against U.S. and Mexican drone surveillance while conducting their own operations. The asymmetry that favored state actors is eroding.

Response is deploying. U.S. military counter-UAS systems are operational on the border. Engagement authority exists. The conditions for kinetic exchange are present.

Escalation pressure is building. Political momentum toward direct action against cartels creates conditions where the current equilibrium—surveillance without strikes—may not hold.

Assessment

The 60,000 surveillance flights documented through December 2024 represented Phase One: intelligence collection. Understanding patterns. Mapping targets. Testing response capabilities.

Phase Two appears to be capability development. FPV training. Weapons integration. Counter-UAS acquisition. Building the tools for sustained operations.

Phase Three—coordinated strikes against U.S. personnel—hasn't materialized. The authorization exists. The capability exists. The intelligence exists.

The restraint may be strategic. Attacking U.S. personnel would trigger responses that could threaten cartel business operations. The surveillance alone costs them little while providing significant advantage.

But strategic calculations change. Leadership transitions. Enforcement pressure. Perceived threats to organizational survival.

The border has become a laboratory for tactics developed in Ukraine. The students have returned. The equipment is in place. The targets are mapped.

What happens next depends on decisions made in Washington, Mexico City, and cartel command structures—decisions that could shift the situation from observation to engagement with very little warning.

Brian Rutherford is an FAA Part 107 pilot, USMC Reconnaissance veteran, and C-UAS consultant who tracks developments where drone technology intersects with security operations.

Sources

• RANE/Stratfor: The Outlook for Trump's War on Mexican Cartels
• Small Wars Journal: Cartel Drone Attacks Growing Exponentially
• Defense News: How Cartels Are Adopting Drone Tactics from Ukraine
• CSIS: Illicit Innovation - Latin America Not Prepared to Fight Criminal Drones
• War on the Rocks: The Future of Criminal Drone Use in Latin America
• DroneXL: Cartels Deploy FPV Drones and Anti-UAS Systems
• Atlantic Council: Drug Cartels Adopting Cutting-Edge Drone Technology
• InSight Crime: Drones in Narcotrafficking and Surveillance
• DefenseScoop: DOD Counter-Drone Deployment at Border
• CNN: CIA Flying Covert Drone Missions Over Mexico
• The War Zone: Army Deploys Radars to Mexico Border
• DroneLife: FY2026 NDAA Counter-UAS Provisions