December 27, 2025. WIRED publishes its annual "World in 2026" predictions.
Among the technology forecasts and policy analysis, two former Pentagon officials make a statement worth careful attention:
"It is certain that in 2026 we will see a drone attack in the United States, against either civilian or military targets."
Not "possible." Not "likely." Certain.
Raj Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff aren't media commentators. Shah directed the Defense Innovation Unit. Kirchhoff helped establish it. These are the architects of America's Blue UAS framework—the professionals who understand precisely what our drone defenses can and cannot accomplish.
Their assessment warrants consideration.
The Source of This Assessment
Understanding why this prediction carries weight requires context about who made it.
Shah and Kirchhoff spent years within the Pentagon working to modernize American drone capabilities. They confronted bureaucratic resistance. They built systems. They understand where every gap exists because they attempted to address them.
Their recent book, "Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley Are Transforming the Future of War," documents those efforts. But the WIRED article isn't promotional material. It's an assessment based on operational knowledge.
"Currently, no US military installation can reliably repel a complex drone attack like Ukraine's assault of Russian nuclear bombers," they write. "Our civilian infrastructure is even less protected."
Consider that statement carefully. No U.S. military installation. Not "certain bases need improvement." Not "some facilities have vulnerabilities." None of them can reliably stop what's possible today.
Civilian infrastructure remains even more exposed.
The Numbers Behind the Assessment
Ukraine produces approximately 200,000 FPV drones monthly. Unit cost: a few hundred dollars.
The Pentagon's tactical UAS budget supports roughly 4,000 systems annually. Average cost: approximately $100,000 per drone.
This represents more than a capability gap. A $400 Ukrainian FPV drone has demonstrated the ability to destroy a $5 million Russian tank. The economics don't respond to budget allocations or organizational charts.
In 2024, authorities detected 350 unauthorized drones over 100 different U.S. military installations. The trend continues upward. Current detection capabilities struggle to manage recreational-grade platforms near facilities that house nuclear assets.
Power infrastructure: 13,000 drone incursions at U.S. power generation sites documented in 2024 alone. Analysis suggests 60 new vulnerability points are added to the grid daily.
Airports: The FAA recorded 411 unauthorized drone incursions at airports in Q1 2025—a 25% increase over the same period last year.
These aren't attacks. They're demonstrations of what's achievable.
Previous Assessments
This warning isn't new. FBI Director Christopher Wray addressed Congress in 2018:
"The FBI assesses that, given their retail availability, lack of verified identification requirement to procure, general ease of use, and prior use overseas, UAS will be used to facilitate an attack in the United States against a vulnerable target, such as a mass gathering."
Will be used. Not might be.
That assessment was made seven years ago. The threat environment has evolved significantly since. The technology has become more affordable, more capable, more accessible. Tactics have been refined in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, and along the U.S.-Mexico border.
What's changed in defensive capabilities? Committees have formed. Reports have been written. Hearings have been held.
The FBI can provide security coverage for approximately 0.05% of the 240,000 events that qualify for its oversight. That figure is accurate.
The 2026 Threat Environment
Shah and Kirchhoff are specific about their concerns:
"In 2026, we won't see terrorism incidents similar to 9/11. Instead, the next act of terror will begin with the buzzing sound of the drone rotors spinning at 5,000 rpm."
Their primary areas of concern:
World Cup 2026. Eleven U.S. cities hosting matches. Millions of spectators in stadiums designed before drone warfare existed as a concept.
July 4, 2026. The Semiquincentennial—America's 250th anniversary. Mass gatherings nationwide.
Airports. 411 incursions in one quarter. None intercepted by countermeasures. Any could have carried a payload.
Critical infrastructure. Power plants, water treatment facilities, communications nodes. Documented approaches to the power grid alone number in the thousands.
The FBI's National Counter-UAS Center is "preparing" for World Cup. JIATF 401, the Pentagon's counter-drone task force, is "conducting assessments." Preparations are underway.
For something six months away. After a decade of documented threat evolution.
Why the Vulnerability Persists
The Pentagon's fiscal 2026 budget allocates $13.6 billion for autonomous military systems. Secretary Hegseth launched a billion-dollar Drone Dominance Program to produce 340,000 tactical drones over two years.
The timeline is the challenge.
Shah and Kirchhoff's central observation: "The barn door will be open for a year or more as security agencies rush to deploy robust drone defenses."
A year. Minimum.
The World Cup starts in June. Six months.
The Semiquincentennial is July 4th. Six months.
The high-risk period of 2026 will pass before meaningful defensive capabilities are fielded.
What's Been Demonstrated
June 2025. Ukraine launches Operation Spider Web. A single coordinated strike destroys 10% of Russia's strategic nuclear bomber fleet—on the ground, on Russian soil.
Russia has invested billions in air defense. S-400 systems. Electronic warfare complexes. Fighter intercepts. None prevented drone swarms from destroying aircraft valued at over a billion dollars.
That same period, reports emerged of clandestine drone operations inside Iran targeting military and nuclear facilities. The platforms originated from within Iranian territory. Their air defense systems didn't detect them.
Houthi forces—operating with limited resources—forced the USS Harry Truman, a nuclear-powered supercarrier, to maneuver so dramatically that an F-18 slid off the deck. A $56 million aircraft lost to evasive action against drones costing less than a used vehicle.
These aren't theoretical scenarios. This is the current operating environment. This is what adversaries can accomplish today.
The Authority Problem
Four federal agencies have counter-UAS authority: DOD, DOJ, DHS, and DOE.
That's the complete list.
State law enforcement: Can detect. Cannot defeat.
Local police: Can observe. Cannot act.
Private security at stadiums, airports, critical infrastructure: No authority whatsoever. They can contact someone. That someone likely lacks authority as well.
Louisiana—one state—passed legislation granting limited local counter-drone authority. One state out of fifty. In 2025.
The legal framework treats a surveillance drone operated by a criminal organization and a child's birthday present identically. Both are "aircraft." Both receive federal aviation law protection. Interfering with either is a federal offense.
The current system criminalizes defenders who attempt to defend.
Why This Assessment Was Made Public
Shah and Kirchhoff aren't generating attention for commercial purposes. They're attempting to create political momentum for reforms they've advocated for years.
They understand how Washington operates. They understand what's required to accelerate institutional change. They've concluded that a public statement—on the record, with their names attached—may be the only approach with any chance of affecting timelines.
That calculation itself indicates the severity of the situation.
When the architects of the defensive framework publicly warn that the defenses are inadequate, the appropriate response is attention, not dismissal.
The Timeline
Secretary Hegseth's Drone Dominance Program won't field significant numbers until 2027 at the earliest.
JIATF 401 is still "testing and evaluating" counter-UAS components.
The FBI Counter-UAS Center is "preparing" law enforcement for World Cup.
The vulnerability window remains open through World Cup. Through July 4th. Through most of 2026.
Shah and Kirchhoff assess an attack as certain. The FBI Director testified to Congress that drones "will be used" against mass gatherings. The Pentagon acknowledges no military installation can stop a coordinated strike.
These aren't critics or outside observers. These are the professionals with operational knowledge.
The question isn't whether their assessment is accurate. The question is the implications if it proves correct.
Brian Rutherford covers emerging security threats that receive attention in classified settings but less focus in public policy. His background includes operational environments where dismissed warning indicators had serious consequences.
Sources
- Blue UAS Architects Predict 2026 Drone Attack, Highlight Pentagon's Mass Production Gap — DroneXL
- Pentagon Warns It's Not Prepared for Homeland Drone Attack — Defense One
- FBI Director Wray: Terrorists Likely To Use Drones To Attack 'Mass Gatherings' — Daily Caller
- Statement of Christopher Hardee and Micheal Torphy to the Senate Judiciary Committee — FBI.gov
- How to Secure the Sky — Foreign Affairs
- Pentagon Counter-Drone Task Force Plans Golden Dome Link — Defense News
- Small Drones, Big Problems: Managing the Unmanned Threat to the Homeland — Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Pentagon Green-Lights Counter-Drone Strategy Amid 'Urgent' Threat — Defense News
- This is a Glaring Gap in Our National Preparedness — House Homeland Security Committee
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