The DJI Ban: A Policy Without Evidence

On December 22, 2025, the Federal Communications Commission added all foreign-made drones and drone components to its "Covered List"—effectively restricting DJI, Autel, and other non-American manufacturers from bringing new products to the U.S. market.

No formal security audit was completed. No definitive evidence was presented. DJI had requested an investigation multiple times throughout 2025—sending letters in March, June, and December asking federal agencies to examine their products. The requests went unanswered.

The restriction took effect by procedural default.

I'm an FAA-certified commercial drone pilot and a Marine Corps Reconnaissance veteran with combat deployments to Iraq. My work since then has included protective operations for the U.S. State Department, with missions supporting the U.S. Ambassador in contested areas. I understand what substantiated security threats look like. I also recognize when policy serves purposes other than security.

This decision raises questions that deserve examination.

Understanding the Timeline

The term "DJI ban" has circulated for years. Here's what distinguishes this action from previous restrictions.

| When | What Happened | |------|---------------| | 2017-2020 | DOD, DHS, and other agencies restrict DJI for government and military use | | 2021-2023 | Several states pass laws limiting Chinese drones for state agencies | | Dec 2024 | NDAA passes with a provision: if no federal security audit of DJI by December 23, 2025, automatic placement on FCC Covered List | | Early 2025 | U.S. Customs delays DJI shipments; supply constraints emerge | | Spring 2025 | FCC suspends new equipment authorizations for DJI pending review | | Dec 21-22, 2025 | FCC adds all foreign-made drones to Covered List | | Dec 23, 2025 | NDAA deadline passes—automatic provision activates |

The difference now: Previous restrictions applied only to government agencies. Consumers and commercial operators could still purchase and operate DJI equipment without limitation.

The December 2025 FCC action blocks new DJI products from entering the U.S. market entirely. This affects the entire industry—not just federal users.

Existing equipment remains legal to operate. But the supply of new products has been interrupted.

The Mechanics of the Decision

The 2025 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision giving the government one year to conduct a formal security audit of DJI. If no agency completed the review by December 23, 2025, DJI would automatically be added to the FCC Covered List.

No agency was assigned the audit. No agency conducted it. The deadline passed. The provision activated.

DJI now joins companies like Huawei and ZTE on the Covered List—entities the FCC has determined pose "an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States." The procedural difference: those companies underwent formal investigations. DJI's placement resulted from an administrative gap.

What Operators Can and Cannot Do

Let me clarify the practical implications:

Still Permitted:

Flying existing DJI equipment — operational status unchanged
Purchasing models authorized before the restriction — Mavic 3, Mini 4, Matrice 4, etc.
Obtaining replacement parts for current equipment — for now
Commercial operations with your current fleet — Part 107 certification remains valid

Now Restricted:

New DJI models entering the U.S. — no additional product introductions
New drone components from foreign manufacturers — batteries, cameras, sensors
Future products from the company that held 70-90% market share

The FCC emphasized this applies to "future hardware." Worth noting: the restriction also covers components. An estimated 99% of drone batteries are manufactured in China.

The supply chain implications extend beyond any single brand.

The Cost Differential

Here's where the security rationale encounters practical challenges.

The government's alternative to Chinese drones is the Blue UAS program—a list of approved American and allied systems for federal use. The concept is sound.

The economics are significant. Blue UAS drones cost approximately 8 to 14 times more than comparable DJI systems.

A DJI Matrice 300 runs approximately $6,500. Its Blue UAS equivalent ranges from $50,000 to $80,000 for comparable capability.

Law enforcement agencies have begun assessing the impact. Some departments report that if their drone programs are affected, the alternatives would mean either returning to more expensive helicopter operations or absorbing substantial budget increases for American-made systems that—candidly—don't yet match DJI's usability refinement.

I've operated both categories. The American-made options have improved significantly but still lag in certain interface and reliability aspects that DJI addressed years ago.

Examining the Security Concerns

The security questions are legitimate and deserve honest engagement.

Chinese national security laws could theoretically compel companies to share data with Beijing. That's a documented feature of their legal framework, not speculation.

However, the restriction doesn't address several existing mitigation options:

Local Data Mode — DJI offers operational modes that keep all flight data on the device with no cloud synchronization
Network isolation — Government agencies can and do implement air-gapped operations
Third-party security audits — Independent assessments have been conducted; none have documented evidence of data exfiltration
DJI's audit requests — The company repeatedly asked for government examination and received no response

If DJI equipment were actively transmitting sensitive data to foreign actors, one might expect at least one federal agency to have documented that finding during the 12-month window available.

The absence of such findings is notable.

What This Accomplishes

Consider what this restriction achieves:

Market Protection Without Competition

Skydio, the leading American drone manufacturer, exited the consumer market in 2023—unable to compete with DJI on price or capability. Other American and international competitors faced similar challenges.

The restriction removes that competitive pressure through regulatory action rather than market innovation.

Additionally: Skydio drones use Chinese-manufactured batteries. Supply constraints limited customers to one battery per drone through at least Spring 2025.

"American-made" involves complex supply chain realities.

Security Outcomes for Actual Threats

Individuals with malicious intent don't purchase drones through authorized retail channels. They don't register with the FAA. They don't concern themselves with FCC equipment authorization.

Those most affected by this restriction are:

Commercial operators building legitimate businesses
Law enforcement agencies conducting search and rescue
Agricultural operations surveying crops
Media professionals creating content
Recreational pilots following the rules

Actors with harmful intentions will continue accessing equipment through alternative channels. This restriction doesn't meaningfully impede them.

Timing Considerations

Pentagon officials who helped build the Blue UAS framework have publicly assessed that a drone attack on U.S. soil during 2026 is increasingly likely.

This restriction took effect eight months before the FIFA World Cup, when 11 U.S. cities will host events with large crowds in outdoor venues.

FEMA is distributing $250 million in counter-drone grants to World Cup host states. The FBI opened a National Counter-UAS Training Center. The Pentagon created JIATF 401 specifically for drone threat coordination.

The threat environment is being taken seriously. The timing of this restriction—reducing access to capable equipment while threats are escalating—merits consideration.

Industry Impact Assessment

The Pilot Institute surveyed 8,000 drone pilots regarding the FCC restriction. The findings:

43% anticipate an "extremely negative" or "potentially business-ending" impact
80%+ project significant operational challenges within two years

These responses come from commercial operators—the professionals conducting infrastructure inspection, real estate documentation, search and rescue, precision agriculture.

The economic effects on the drone services sector will become clearer over the coming months.

A Practical Approach Going Forward

Policy analysis aside, operators need to plan within current realities.

Near-Term (Next 6 Months)

Secure spare components for current fleet—batteries, propellers, critical parts
Maintain existing equipment with attention to longevity
Document capabilities and costs for potential future justification of replacement investments

Medium-Term (6-18 Months)

Evaluate Blue UAS alternatives — understand the options despite cost differentials
Consider enterprise relationships — larger contracts can absorb higher equipment costs
Diversify service offerings — reduce dependence on any single equipment category

Ongoing

Monitor regulatory developments — this restriction could be modified, expanded, or reconsidered
Engage industry organizations — collective advocacy has influenced policy before
Adapt — the drone industry has navigated regulatory uncertainty throughout its development

Assessment

The DJI restriction resulted from procedural mechanics rather than demonstrated security findings. No audit was conducted. No evidence was presented. Market-leading equipment was restricted by administrative default while American alternatives remain more expensive and less refined.

The individuals and organizations most affected are American operators trying to conduct legitimate work. The security threats the restriction ostensibly addresses—malicious actors with harmful intent—operate outside these regulatory frameworks.

Those are the observable facts. Reasonable people can reach different conclusions about their implications.

What remains constant: operators will adapt. The drone industry has navigated regulatory uncertainty before and will do so again.

Because that's what professionals do.

Continuing the Conversation

I'm interested in hearing from other Part 107 pilots and commercial operators. What effects are you observing? What approaches are you considering?

The comment section is open, or reach out directly.

Brian Rutherford is a Marine Corps Reconnaissance veteran, FAA Part 107 certified drone pilot, and security professional with expertise in counter-UAS assessment. He writes about the intersection of drone technology, security, and regulatory policy.

Sources

Tags: #DJIBan #Part107 #DronePolicy #CounterUAS #CommercialDrones #FCC #UAS #DroneNews

Republishing

This article may be republished with attribution. Please link back to the original.