February 1, 2025. El Paso Sector Intelligence distributed an alert.
Cartel leadership had authorized explosive-equipped drones for use against U.S. Border Patrol and military personnel.
Not "under consideration." Authorized.
That assessment went up the chain. Understanding its implications requires context about the operational environment it describes.
The Operational Scale
Sixty thousand drone flights along the southern border in six months. July through December 2024. Twenty-seven thousand unique airframes documented.
These aren't consumer-grade platforms from electronics retailers. Analysis indicates systems capable of 100+ mph, 45-minute loiter times, and payloads exceeding 100 pounds. Operations concentrate between 2000 and 0400 hours—when visual detection is most difficult.
DHS confirms cartel drones operate "nearly every day." Their documented function: persistent surveillance of U.S. personnel. Tracking patrol routes. Timing shift changes. Identifying coverage gaps.
This represents systematic intelligence collection against American operations on American soil.
The legal framework limits response options to documentation and reporting.
Lessons Applied
The cartels observed what $500 FPV drones accomplished against Russian armor in Ukraine. They noted how operators with gaming controllers destroyed armored vehicles worth millions.
In Mexico, CJNG and Sinaloa have moved from surveillance to kinetic operations. 2023 data: over 260 drone-dropped explosive incidents. Forty-two Mexican security personnel wounded—not criminals or cartel rivals, but government forces.
The capability evolution:
- 2020: 4 pounds at 45 mph
- 2023: 25-pound packages at 75 mph
- Current: 100+ pound capacity
This isn't experimentation. It's operational integration. Reports indicate personnel training—some conducted overseas—on FPV piloting, explosive integration, and counter-detection techniques. Jamming equipment is being acquired to defeat U.S. surveillance while conducting their own.
This represents an adversary force with ISR capability, strike platforms, and electronic warfare capacity operating near American border cities.
The Intelligence Assessment
The February alert was specific, as intelligence products tend to be when they concern personnel safety.
Cartel leaders had authorized kinetic drone operations against U.S. personnel at the border.
Rear Admiral Paul Spedero confirmed publicly: "We know that cartels have used UAS for unauthorized surveillance to assess our troop size, our movements, to solicit and enable attacks from other vectors. We know that they have used drones for kinetic attacks."
He also noted: "A change in circumstances might alter their willingness to conduct acts of violence against U.S. authorities or persons along the border."
Translation: The authorization exists. The capability exists. The calculus determining when to execute could shift based on various factors—enforcement actions, political changes, operational decisions by cartel leadership.
The threat is documented. The timeline is uncertain.
The Response Framework
Consider the operational position of a Border Patrol agent in the Arizona desert who identifies a cartel surveillance drone. The platform is tracking his position and transmitting to parties with documented authorization to conduct kinetic operations.
His available responses:
- Document the observation
- Report the incident
- Continue mission
Under FAA regulations, the drone is a registered aircraft. Interfering with it—jamming, disabling, capturing—constitutes a federal offense.
An American agent being surveilled by a hostile criminal organization with documented strike authorization cannot legally take action against the surveillance platform.
Four federal agencies have counter-UAS authority: DOD, DOJ, DHS, and DOE. The personnel on the ground, conducting the missions, facing the documented threat, have detection capability without mitigation authority.
The Economics
Why 60,000 flights in six months? The return on investment is substantial.
A single successful drone run can yield $10,000 to $50,000 depending on payload and destination. Platform cost: a few thousand dollars. Even with significant loss rates, the margin remains compelling.
Fentanyl. Methamphetamine. Weapons. Cash. Human trafficking coordination. The drones transport product and information with limited interdiction risk.
Robert Green at the American Correctional Association observed: "These are organized groups, gangs, cartels. We're talking about large sums of money."
Organizations don't abandon profitable operations. They protect and expand them. That pattern is documented across multiple continents and conflict environments.
The Military Response
DOD is deploying counter-drone systems to the border following executive orders demanding "complete operational control."
The timeline: large-scale counter-drone exercises from January to May 2026. Five months of exercises while agents are being surveilled nightly by platforms potentially configured for kinetic operations.
Persistent C-UAS coverage along high-threat corridors could have been established earlier. The intelligence existed. The capability existed. The deployment decision came later.
The cartels aren't static. They adapt to responses. By the time exercises produce operational capability, their tactics will have adjusted to whatever gets deployed.
Assessment
Hard intelligence documents imminent threats to U.S. personnel. Enemy capability with proven lethality is documented. The scale—60,000 flights—constitutes a campaign, not isolated incidents. The escalation trajectory is clear.
The story raises questions:
How did cartels develop this capability along the border?
Why can't Border Patrol agents take action against surveillance platforms tracking them?
Why did explicit authorization for explosive attacks precede significant response acceleration?
Why are exercises still underway when the threat is active?
These questions merit consideration.
Requirements
Persistent C-UAS deployment. Operational systems on the border with engagement authority for hostile platforms.
Authority to the point of contact. Personnel facing documented threats need legal ability to respond. This requires policy decisions, not new technology.
Threat communication. Americans have reasonable interest in understanding the threat environment at their own border.
Source disruption. Detecting drones over Arizona doesn't affect operators in Sonora. Degrading cartel drone capability at source—supply chains, training, operators—addresses root causes.
The Situation
Demonstrated capability. Documented intent. Organizational authorization for drone attacks against U.S. personnel.
Detection systems that can't respond. Legal frameworks that protect hostile platforms. Response timelines measured in months against threats measured in hours.
The pattern is recognizable from other environments where surveillance platforms evolved to strike platforms. That transition follows documented patterns. Those patterns are observable along the border now.
The choice is between acting with appropriate urgency or waiting for consequences that could have been anticipated.
Brian Rutherford covers security developments where intelligence and institutional response intersect. His background includes operational environments where threat assessment accuracy mattered.
Sources
- Cartels Flew Drones 60,000 Times Along US Border — Border Report
- Mexican Cartels Escalate Drone Warfare Against Border Patrol — DroneXL
- US Border Agents Now Face Drone Bombs Threat — Newsweek
- Mexico's Cartel Drones Are Eliminating Their Competition — DroneXL
- DOD to Deploy Counter-Drone at US-Mexico Border — DefenseScoop
- NCTC: Use of UAS by Mexico-Based Cartels — DNI/NCTC
- Countering Cartel Drone Threats — Axon
- Cops, Cartels and the New Drone Wars — Axios
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