The FCC Restricted All Foreign Drones, Not Just DJI

December 22, 2025. The FCC updates its Covered List.

The headlines focused on "DJI Ban." That's accurate. It's also incomplete.

The actual language adds all foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems and all foreign-produced UAS critical components to the list. Not Chinese drones specifically. Not particular manufacturers. All foreign-produced.

That includes European manufacturers. Swiss. German. French. Allied nations. Every drone and component not produced in the United States.

The industry focused on DJI because it's the largest name. But the supply chain implications extend far beyond one Chinese company.

What the FCC Actually Stated

The FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau released a Public Notice on December 22, 2025. Two categories were added to the Covered List:

Category One: All UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries.

Category Two: Communications and video surveillance equipment from DJI Technologies and Autel Robotics, including subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, and joint ventures.

Category Two received attention. Category One may have greater implications.

The Component Definition Is Comprehensive

The FCC defines "UAS critical components" broadly:

Data transmission devices
Communications systems
Flight controllers
Ground control stations and UAS controllers
Navigation systems
Sensors and cameras
Batteries and battery management systems
Any associated software

That encompasses most of what comprises a drone. If any of these components is produced outside the United States, it falls under Covered List restrictions.

Consider the implications for "American-made" drones that source components globally. A U.S. manufacturer using Japanese cameras, Korean batteries, or German sensors now faces the same restrictions as a Chinese import.

The FCC explicitly states: "UAS and UAS critical components must be produced in the United States."

The Exemption Pathway

The rule includes an exemption pathway: the Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security can certify that a specific foreign component doesn't pose unacceptable risks.

In practice, this process is substantial.

Getting DOD or DHS to review and certify individual components is a bureaucratic process designed for national security equipment, not commercial supply chains. The timeline extends months to years. Documentation requirements are extensive. Approval criteria are detailed.

Most commercial drone manufacturers won't wait extended periods for certification of individual components. They'll source domestically or exit affected markets.

European Manufacturers Face the Same Restrictions

The FCC's language says "foreign-made." It doesn't say "Chinese" or "adversary nations."

Swiss drone manufacturer Wingtra? Foreign. German industrial drones? Foreign. French surveying platforms? Foreign. Israeli defense systems? Foreign.

Allied nations don't receive automatic exemptions. NATO membership doesn't qualify for the carve-out. The exemption requires specific DOD/DHS certification for specific products.

European manufacturers who built American distribution networks over the past decade now face the same market restrictions as DJI. No new products. No new authorizations. Existing equipment can operate, but the pipeline is constrained.

The "Already Authorized" Provision

The FCC emphasized that previously authorized equipment isn't affected. Drones already in service can continue operating. Models already approved for sale remain available.

This is why existing DJI equipment still works. This is why retailers can still sell existing inventory.

But the provision only covers past authorizations. New product lines, new models, updated versions—those require new authorizations that will be denied under the Covered List addition.

DJI can't bring new products to the American market. Neither can Autel. Neither can any foreign manufacturer without going through the exemption process.

The existing fleet ages. Technology updates become unavailable. The market constrains.

The Supply Chain Challenge

Here's what the industry is processing: almost no "American" drone is fully American.

Manufacturing is global. Components come from wherever quality meets price effectively. Even Blue UAS approved platforms—drones certified for government use—source components internationally.

The FCC rule doesn't grandfather existing supply chains. It applies to components regardless of where final assembly happens.

A drone assembled in Texas with:

Chinese cameras
Korean batteries
Japanese sensors
Taiwanese chips

...is potentially non-compliant. Each component is foreign-produced. Each falls under the Covered List.

Manufacturers must either certify their supply chains are fully domestic, seek exemptions for every foreign component, or redesign products substantially.

Why This Was Partially Overlooked

The December 22 announcement dominated by "DJI" headlines communicated action on Chinese drones without drawing attention to the broader implications.

Legal analysts identified it. Wiley Law called it an "unexpected, first-of-its-kind action." Holland & Knight noted the addition of "all foreign-made drones and critical components." Akin Gump highlighted the exemption requirements.

But industry media led with DJI. Social media focused on DJI. The narrative became "Chinese drone ban" rather than "foreign drone ban."

By the time the broader implications registered, the rule was effective.

The National Security Rationale

The FCC's rationale connects UAS restrictions to supply chain security:

"To ensure American companies are able to meet both peacetime and wartime demand, the U.S. UAS industry cannot rely on foreign-produced UAS critical components."

The concern isn't solely data security or surveillance—though those are cited. It's industrial capacity. In a conflict scenario, foreign supply chains can be disrupted.

The FCC explicitly referenced upcoming events: the 2026 World Cup and 2028 Los Angeles Olympics. Large-scale drone operations for security, media, and logistics require reliable supply chains.

Relying on foreign manufacturers for critical capabilities during major events is the risk being addressed. Whether domestic manufacturing can scale quickly enough determines outcomes.

China's Response

December 23, 2025. China's Commerce Ministry issued a statement calling the action a "wrong practice" and urging reversal.

More significantly, they stated China would "take necessary measures to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises."

Possible responses include:

Export restrictions on rare earth materials critical to electronics
Tariffs on American technology products
Regulatory action against American companies operating in China
Restrictions on component supply to American manufacturers

The drone market is a fraction of U.S.-China trade. But supply chain dependencies cut both ways.

For Operators

Inventory your equipment. Identify which drones and components are foreign-produced. Understand what can continue operating versus what can't be replaced.

Assess future needs. If operations depend on specific platforms or capabilities, determine whether domestic alternatives exist.

Monitor exemption announcements. DOD and DHS may certify specific components or manufacturers. Those certifications could open supply options.

Plan for price adjustments. Domestic manufacturing costs more. The gap between a $2,500 DJI platform and its American equivalent represents the new pricing environment.

Consider current inventory. Existing inventory remains legal to sell and operate. If specific equipment is critical to operations, additional units may be worth securing while available.

For Manufacturers

Supply chain auditing. Trace every component to production origin. Identify foreign-produced items requiring exemption or replacement.

Domestic sourcing. Begin qualifying American suppliers for components currently sourced internationally. This takes months to years.

Exemption applications. For components that cannot be domestically sourced, prepare documentation for DOD/DHS review.

Product redesign. Where exemptions are unlikely, redesign products around available domestic components. Accept capability and cost tradeoffs.

Customer communication. Be transparent about timelines and limitations. Operators need accurate information for planning.

Assessment

The "DJI Ban" is real. The broader FCC action restricts all foreign-produced drones and components, not just Chinese ones.

Allied-nation manufacturers face the same restrictions as adversary-nation manufacturers. The exemption process is substantial. Supply chains that span borders now span regulations.

This affects every operator, every manufacturer, every enterprise user depending on drone technology. The platforms in operation today remain legal. The platforms needed tomorrow may face availability constraints.

The distinction between "DJI ban" and "foreign drone ban" matters more than headlines suggested.

Brian Rutherford tracks regulatory changes that reshape industries while attention focuses elsewhere.

Sources

FCC Adds Foreign-Made Drones and Components to Covered List, Citing National Security Risks — DroneLIFE
FCC Updates Covered List to Add Certain UAS and UAS Components — FCC
Not Just DJI: How the FCC's Foreign Drone Rule Changes the Market — DroneLIFE
FACT SHEET: FCC Updates Covered List to Include Foreign UAS — FCC
FCC Adds All Foreign-Made Drones and Critical Components to the Covered List — Holland & Knight
In Unexpected, First-of-Its-Kind Action, FCC Adds All Foreign-Produced UAS to Covered List — Wiley Law
FCC Adds All Foreign-Made UAS and UAS Critical Components to Covered List — Akin Gump